



 ‘Gamekeeper Turned Poacher’: Frank Chapple, Anti-Communism 
and Soviet Human Rights Violations 
Mark Hurst, Lancaster University 
On 10 April 1985, some 300 delegates from around the world gathered in London to consider 
reports of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. The International Sakharov Hearings, 
named after the prominent physicist and political dissident Andrei Sakharov, put the Soviet 
authorities ‘on trial’ for breaching human rights provisions set out in the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords.1 The 1985 event was the fifth edition of these hearings, after previous events in 
Copenhagen, Rome, Washington and Lisbon.2 The hearings included presentations from those 
who had experienced Soviet abuse first-hand – for instance the dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva 
and the lawyer Dina Kaminskaya – as well as foreign specialists on the Soviet Union.3 The list 
of participants also provides a snapshot of prominent British activists who campaigned to raise 
awareness of Soviet abuses. They included Michael Bourdeaux and Sir John Lawrence, founder 
members of Keston College, which was devoted to the study of religion in communist 
countries; Allan Wynn, the Chairman of the Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters 
in Mental Hospitals; the playwright Tom Stoppard; the physicist John Ziman; and Peter 
Reddaway, an academic central to this broader network.4 
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After two days of presentations, the hearings concluded that the material presented 
suggested ‘a considerable deterioration of the human rights situation in the USSR, as reflected 
both in its law and in its practices’, a situation that was ‘worse now than in 1975, when the 
Helsinki Accords were signed’.5 Whilst this conclusion had no legal clout, the collected 
expertise and experience of those involved meant that the hearings and its conclusion were 
noted in the press. Given the background of the contributors to the hearings, this conclusion 
was perhaps of little surprise. However, amongst the chorus of committed activists denouncing 
the Soviet government one individual stands out – the trade union leader Frank Chapple. 
Chapple was approached to take part in the hearings through the efforts of Bill Jaeger, 
a prominent member of Moral Re-Armament, an organization concerned with promoting 
discussion between adversaries, albeit with a history of anti-Communist activity.6 During a 
visit to the United States, Jaeger met Tatiana Yankelevitch, Sakharov’s step-daughter, and her 
husband Efrem – Sakharov’s personal representative in the West involved in organizing the 
hearings. During this meeting, potential participants for the hearings were discussed, and Jaeger 
mentioned Chapple, whose recent appointment to the House of Lords, gave him a ‘very good 
platform to say things to the nation’, an appealing trait for the organisers.7 Jaeger’s suggestion 
was endorsed by the Yankelevitches, who sent a letter of invitation on to Chapple via Jaeger.8  
A major aim of these hearings was to publicly highlight Soviet abuses, drawing on the 
reputation of those involved to attract the attention of the press. This can be seen in the role of 
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Simon Wiesenthal in chairing this event. The prominent ‘Nazi hunter’ drew a ‘slavering pack 
of newsmen’ to the hearings concerned for comment on the case of the Nazi physician Josef 
Mengele, who had been put on trial in absentia in Jerusalem earlier that year. Commenting 
instead on Soviet matters, Wiesenthal used the media spotlight to praise Sakharov as ‘the 
greatest humanitarian of our time’, thereby giving the dissident’s position much welcomed 
publicity.9  
Owing to his public profile, Chapple also drew attention to the hearings although he 
was, by his own admission, an ‘awkward bugger’.10 Upon accepting the invitation, he noted 
with caution that ‘the political divisions in the UK are such that if you have people from one 
political persuasion you find objections from the rest…Indeed, including me on the panel 
would almost certainly guarantee that other Trade Union [sic] people would not want to sit on 
the panel’.11 To some, Chapple was ‘Britain’s most awkward and antagonistic Trade Union 
[sic] leader; to others he [was] the most courageous of them all’.12 The Daily Mirror columnist 
Paul Routledge described him as a ‘sharp lad with a merciless grasp of the labour 
movement…[who] ran his union like the mafia’.13 Despite this, Chapple’s peerage made him 
an outcast for many on the left, particularly as it was granted to him by the Conservative 
Margaret Thatcher in 1985, a period of particular political tension.14 One critic even went as 
far to state that ‘Frank Chapple has given a new word to the English language. From now on, 
a Chapple will mean a traitor to the working man’.15 This moniker had resonance for some, as 
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shortly after his death in 2004, an article in The Socialist Worker described him as a man with 
‘an air of arrogance and sheer menace about him’ who ‘won’t be missed much’.16  
Nevertheless, Chapple was a powerful union leader who commanded wide support 
from his union’s membership for nearly two decades, becoming the President of the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) in 1983. Beneath his aggressive style, and the ideological divisiveness 
that this encouraged, lay an important figure in the British union movement aware of his 
political influence. Calum Aikman has deftly noted that Chapple’s ‘pugnacity and love of 
argument often concealed a subtle mind’ which was put towards protecting the interests of his 
union’s members at all costs.17  
Chapple’s involvement in casting judgment on the Soviet Union alongside activists, 
academics and a Nazi hunter highlight the challenges of assessing support for human rights in 
the context of broader ideological tensions in the twentieth century. This assessment of 
Chapple’s case sheds light on the multifaceted network of activists campaigning to highlight 
Soviet abuses in the 1970s and 1980s, the complexities of formal and informal Anglo-Soviet 
relations in the Cold War, and the historiographical difficulties in assessing trade union support 
for human rights issues in the Cold War.18 Chapple’s support for human rights issues in the 
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Soviet bloc was intertwined with his own political history, in which he shifted from supporting 
the utopian ideals of communism in the 1940s, through a period of ideological challenge in the 
1950s and 1960s, before his anti-communist ideals became more firmly entrenched in the 
1970s and 1980s. For many on the British left, events such as the 1956 Hungarian Uprising 
challenged their ‘faith’ in Soviet communism, but Chapple’s renunciation was especially acute. 
His transition from communist party gamekeeper to political poacher offers an insight into the 
impact that the Cold War had on British trade union politics, further developing a broad 
literature surrounding this topic by drawing attention to human rights issues in this period.19 
This article has two aims. First, it will set the background of Chapple’s ascendency to 
prominence in the union movement, outlining how his ideological transition gave him political 
power, highlighting some of the difficulties in assessing his history. The difficulties in 
navigating between historical events and personal reflections on the past is far from unique to 
Chapple’s case, but the context of his ideological transition and the implications it had for his 
motivations to support human rights issues in the Soviet Union makes his case particularly 
interesting. Instead of ruining his reputation, Chapple’s ideological volte face gave him 
political credibility, and arguably shaped his political legacy.  
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Second, this article will identify how Chapple’s support for victims of human rights 
violations in the Soviet bloc dovetailed with his attacks on communist supporters in the labour 
movement, an issue that clearly drew on his ideological history. Despite the historic ties 
between British trade unions and their Soviet counterparts, there were prominent trade 
unionists who sought to highlight Soviet persecution, drawing on their own disillusionment 
with Soviet communism in the process. The way in which British trade union leaders such as 
Ernest Bevin and Walter Citrine engaged with the Soviet Union has been the subject of critical 
reassessment in recent years, highlighting the subtleties of these transnational ties.20 Alongside 
a concern for the suffering of others, Chapple’s earlier interactions with Soviet communism 
played a significant role in influencing his later concern for human rights issues in the Soviet 
bloc. A consideration of these broader, and often more subtle motivations thus draws attention 
to the intersection between human rights activism and the politics of the British left – a space 
rightly highlighted as deserving of further scholarly attention.21 In doing so, this article argues 
that support for these activist efforts was motivated by both contemporaneous human rights 
concerns and internal trade union politics, offering a fresh perspective on the contexts of 
transnational campaigns in the Cold War. 
 
Political foundations 
Born in 1921 in a flat above his father’s boot and shoe repair shop in the ‘poverty-stricken East 
End slum’ of Shoreditch, London, Chapple considered his childhood to be ‘lucky’ by the 
standards of the day.22 Chapple left school at 14 and was taken on as an apprentice by an 
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electrical firm, becoming a member of the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) in 1936. This was 
notoriously difficult given the restrictions on new members that this skilled union would accept 
due to high levels of unemployment.23 His membership of the ETU became an integral part of 
Chapple’s politics, which was also being influenced in this period by parties on both ends of 
political spectrum. Whilst his mother ‘used to vote Tory, like her family’ and his father was 
uninterested in politics, the family’s shop was ‘the centre of discussion for everything under 
the sun – from pigeons to politics’.24 In this environment, Chapple met a policeman who had 
been spellbound by a speech by Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB). Chapple noted in his 1984 autobiography Sparks Fly! that, ‘many 
years later, when the time came for me to make political decisions, that casual back-of-the shop 
chat became decidedly relevant. It helped to push me along a political road which was at first 
exhilarating, but which I later came to abhor.’25  
Chapple joined the CPGB in 1939, and remained an active party member for nearly two 
decades.26 In a letter to the US embassy in March 1963 – a document that accounts for his 
CPGB membership in the context of his plans to obtain a visa to visit the United States – 
Chapple noted that he had joined the party because it seemed to be ‘the only political 
organisation conducting any activity of an anti-Fascist character’.27 Chapple had been attacked 
by members of the British Union of Fascists (BUF) active in the East End of London, who 
‘terrorised [his] neighbourhood with their regular marches in uniform to the beat of banging 
drums and clashing symbols’.28 Whilst he describes being ‘pushed’ towards the CPGB by the 
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political climate of the day and the desire to stand up against the BUF, it is difficult to ignore 
the ‘pull’ of communist ideals – something likely omitted from this account for pragmatic 
reasons.  
Upon joining the CPGB, Chapple was given a list of comrades in his ETU branch and 
instructed to support their efforts to become elected union representatives by all means 
available.29 The attempt to dominate the trade union movement by positioning communists in 
as many elected positions as possible was a staple of the CPGB’s political strategy, an approach 
described by Glyn Powell as ‘largely unarticulated and politically inarticulate’.30 John 
Callaghan is less critical, noting that as a tactic, ‘it was remarkably simple and remarkably 
attuned to British institutions’. By gaining a foothold, the CPGB could use trade unions as a 
vehicle to influence mainstream politics, a tactic unlikely to have significant political impact 
but a manageable aim nevertheless.31 The intertwining of union and party politics became clear 
to Chapple when he attended CPGB meetings in the London Docks in the early-1940s, recalling 
that ‘the majority of Communists who attended these meetings were also ETU members’.32 
Chapple, however, appeared unconcerned by this tactic at the time, as in late-1942 he took up 
a full-time position within the CPGB as an organiser for the Young Communist League.33  
Despite actively promoting communism as a party member in the 1940s, Chapple later 
maintained that his political beliefs had been challenged by his experiences during the Second 
World War. Following his conscription in April 1943, Chapple made use of his skills as an 
electrician during his posting in the Army’s Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.  
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Whilst stationed in the north German city of Lübeck, Chapple was surprised to find Russian 
prisoners of war reluctant to be repatriated back to their communist homeland, only later 
discovering that many feared they would be executed as traitors or deserters. Whilst the lack 
of a common language was a problem, through a ‘mixture of English and broken German, 
Chapple also spoke to Soviet soldiers who asserted that life would be better if they stayed in 
Western Europe rather than returning home – something that Chapple later claimed had ‘special 
importance’ for him.34 After the war, Chapple remained politically active in Lübeck: collecting 
money for the Daily Worker and supporting the German Communist Party by passing on to 
them the ‘occasional jerry can of British Army petrol – a precious commodity for them’.35 
Upon his redeployment to Osnabrück, Chapple once again offered his support to the German 
Communist Party. These efforts were noted in a letter of commendation sent to the CPGB by 
the German Communist Party on 24 April 1947 which thanked Chapple for his help in their 
political work.36 This political activity raises questions about the immediate impact of 
Chapple’s interactions with those who had first-hand experience of the Soviet Union, and its 
claimed ‘special importance’ in shaping his perspective on the communist state. 
Upon returning to Britain in 1947 after being ‘demobbed’, Chapple’s support for the 
CPGB continued. He transferred his Union branch from Gray’s Inn to London Station 
Engineers No. 10 where he became the assistant branch secretary.37 Gray’s Inn ‘already had 
sufficient members of the Communist Party for the purposes of the party’, so Chapple was 
better placed elsewhere to aid CPGB efforts in the ETU – a move that sits somewhat in contrast 
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to his later recollections of his wartime experiences.38 From this new branch, Chapple swiftly 
rose through the ranks of the CPGB and the ETU.39 He became a member of the CPGB’s Party 
Advisory Committee in London between 1948 and 1957, whose purpose was to coordinate ‘the 
activity of all Communist Party members of the ETU in the London Area in enacting the policy 
and aims of the Communist Party’.40 Alongside this, Chapple was invited in 1949 to attend 
meetings of the National Advisory Committee, a body that coordinated Communists in the 
ETU at a national level, by Frank Haxell, the General Secretary of the ETU and a CPGB 
member.41 Through membership of these committees, Chapple saw the CPGB’s attempts to 
manipulate the ETU first-hand, recalling that meetings were held ‘just before the quarterly 
meetings of the Union [so] we could keep fresh in the minds of the members attending the 
meetings the names of the persons to be nominated for office and the resolutions which we 
wished to have moved’.42 The political line between the ETU and the CPGB became so blurred 
in this period that Chapple recalled that ‘changes in the policy of the union always arose as a 
result of discussions which had taken place at the National Advisory Committees of the 
Communist Party’.43  
 
Leaving the party 
 
By the mid-1950s, Chapple’s ascendancy in the CPGB began to stall. He was one of several 
members removed from the National Advisory Committee in July 1954 on the orders of Haxell 
                                                          
38 Chapple, ‘Letter to US Embassy’. 
39 Chapple, Sparks Fly!, 47. 
40 Chapple, ‘Letter to US Embassy’. 
41 Chapple, ‘Letter to US Embassy’. 
42 Chapple, ‘Letter to US Embassy’. 





who, according to Chapple, was attempting to purge his opponents from positions of power. 
Perhaps as a result of this isolation, Chapple began to publicly disagree with the leadership of 
the ETU, claiming in later years that it had become clear to him that the role of the Advisory 
Committees was ‘to act as a rubber stamp for the policies thought up by a select group of people 
at the Communist Party’s Headquarters’.44 Although invited to continue to attend Advisory 
Committee meetings in early 1958, Chapple refused – an act of dissent that led to his 
suspension from the CPGB whilst an investigation into his conduct took place.45 
The timing of Chapple’s ‘stall’ in the CPGB in the mid-1950s is worth noting. The 
echoes of the death of Stalin, the fallout of the ‘Doctor’s Plot’ and the 1956 Hungarian Uprising 
tested the faith of many communists. This was a period when communism became ‘the God 
that failed’ for many, with the events taking place in Hungary leading many on the British left 
to renounce their faith in the communist experiment.46 Callaghan notes that this ‘cost the 
[CPGB] many of its best militants and around one third of its membership’, and shocked the 
resolve of the remaining faithful.47 Chapple later recalled his anger at reports of Soviet brutality 
in Budapest, particularly his inability to do anything to assist Hungarian workers in their hour 
of need.48 It was these events that led him to resolve that ‘not only must I break with the Party 
but I should try to draw out of the Party with me as many other members as I could’.49 For 
Chapple, these events, combined with personal attacks against him by communist ETU 
officials, became the ‘straw that broke the back of my belief in communism’, seeing that ‘the 
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theories of communism, i.e. Marxism and Leninism, [were] in fact the sources of the practices 
which I grew to abhor’.50  
Assessing Chapple’s motivations in this period is a remarkably challenging task for 
historians, as his reflections on this period were written after he had broken with the CPGB, 
offering a perspective on the period that is coloured by later events. This is an issue far from 
unique to Chapple, but an intriguing one nonetheless, given the layers of identity, ideology and 
memory at play in this instance. His doubts in communism came in a period when many on the 
British left were renouncing their ‘faith’, but the key documents on this period were written in 
a later period when he had established himself as a prominent anti-communist figure, especially 
his autobiography Sparks Fly! and the account of his involvement in the Communist Party sent 
to the US Embassy. Chapple recognized the challenges in assessing this period, describing his 
US Embassy account as ‘either the mutterings of a village idiot or the efforts of somebody 
trying to hide his murky past – neither of which, I assure you, is my intention’.51 This is not to 
discount the value of these sources in assessing this political transition, but to highlight the 
need to tread carefully with their claims given later events.  
Whilst Chapple’s faith in the CPGB faltered, his rise in the ETU continued. In 1957 he 
took up a position on the union’s Executive Council during a period when concerns about 
communist manipulation in the union came under intense public scrutiny.52 Leading figures in 
the ETU such as Les Cannon were removed from positions of authority after they challenged 
suspicious election results in the mid-1950s. Cannon resigned from the CPGB shortly before 
the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, stating his conviction that there was ‘no place for the Communist 
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Party now’, which clearly did not sit well with CPGB members in the ETU.53 At the time, 
Cannon was employed as an Education Officer at the ETU’s training college in Esher, a facility 
described in the Daily Mail as the union’s ‘Little Moscow’, highlighting public awareness of 
communist influence in the union.54 Following Cannon’s CPGB resignation, the ETU closed 
this facility in May 1957, citing financial pressure and making him redundant in the process. 
In response, Cannon joined with the Labour MP Woodrow Wyatt to expose the CPGB in an 
episode of the BBC’s Panorama programme aired in December 1957.55 These criticisms were 
mirrored by unrest amongst ETU members, who passed a motion at its 1957 annual conference 
criticizing the union’s leadership for its lacklustre response towards both the shooting of 
workers in Poznan and the Hungarian Uprising.56  
Frustrations amongst the ETU membership were reported widely in the national press 
alongside forthright calls for an investigation into the union’s election practices, and anti-
communist sections of the union began to organise in secret meetings to challenge the 
leadership.57 Despite this, communists managed to maintain their grip, and Frank Foulkes, the 
ETU’s president, publicly claimed in May 1958 that his union’s 240,000 members were united 
in supporting its leadership.58 A pro-Soviet line was also evident in the union’s work, such as 
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the May 1958 call for ETU members to take action to prevent nuclear missiles being stationed 
in Britain.59  
Perhaps bolstered by public criticism of the CPGB’s involvement in the ETU, the 
context of public concerns in the ETU’s leadership and Cannon’s example, Chapple resigned 
from the CPGB after 19 years of membership in November 1958. In statements to the press, 
he made it clear that he felt ‘socialism cannot be fostered by a party whose structure is 
undemocratic and whose organisational form is conspiratorial’ – a clear attack on the 
organization of the CPGB rather than its underlying ideology, somewhat protecting his own 
shifting political position. Chapple’s resignation was significant for the ETU as he remained 
on the Executive Council, meaning that communists no longer held a majority amongst the 
ETU’s leadership.60  
Chapple and Cannon’s criticisms of the ETU’s leadership carried particular clout 
because of their prior CPGB membership. As the Daily Mail’s Leslie Randall noted in 
December 1959, ‘the TUC must take serious notice of the charges because Mr Chapple can 
speak from inside knowledge. He was himself a member of the Communist Party until a year 
ago.’61 Chapple’s intimate knowledge of the CPGB became a great strength in his attacks 
against them. As John Lloyd noted, ‘Not only did [Chapple] know most of the personalities 
concerned; not only had he been a participant in the committee and organization of the 
communists; he knew the way they thought; he knew the ‘holy texts’ of Marxism. He was as 
‘scientific’ about political ideas as they were.’62 Any illicit support that Chapple may have 
received from former party comrades to get him to a prominent position in the ETU was 
seemingly ignored, and his transition marked him out as an individual with valuable 
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knowledge, rather than a character with a dubious past. The act of changing allegiance wiped 
the slate clean, allowing Chapple a fresh start with an arguably heightened position of authority. 
The fallout of the increasingly public spat between communist and anti-communist 
sections of the ETU was brought into sharp focus in its 1959 General Secretary election, 
contested by the incumbent Haxell and John ‘Jock’ Byrne. Despite polling taking place in 
December 1959, it took until February 1960 for the results to be announced, sparking rumours 
that the ballot had been rigged in favour of Haxell.63 Aware of the damage that outright ballot-
rigging would cause, the TUC gave the ETU’s leadership an ultimatum: take action in the 
courts to refute allegations of malpractice or undergo an independent inquiry on the matter.64 
This was a thin threat, as a similar ultimatum had been served two years previously with little 
consequence.65 Sensing an opportunity, Chapple and Byrne announced in May 1960 that they 
were taking legal action against the ETU leadership to ‘redress the grievances of members’ 
over the issue of ballot-rigging.66 The subsequent 38-day court case found 5 of the 12 
defendants guilty of breaching the ETU’s rules and preventing the election of Byrne – an 
outcome described as ‘an historic judgement’ in The Observer.67 Cannon and Chapple played 
a central role in the case, with an article in The Spectator noting that ‘if it had not been for the 
information possessed by Frank Chapple and Les Cannon…the action could never have been 
brought to the conclusion of Mr. Justice Winn that the ballot for General Secretary had been 
‘rigged’’.68  
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This judgement led to a number of changes in the ETU’s leadership, most notably the 
appointment of Byrne as General Secretary, a post he duly took up in July 1961.69 One of 
Byrne’s first actions in office was to appoint Chapple and Cannon as special assistants.70 This 
new leadership sought to mark a clean break by banning CPGB members from holding formal 
positions in the union, with The Guardian noting that the union was ‘working up to a major 
purge’.71 Haxell was ostracized by the CPGB, who insisted he take full responsibility for the 
affair and resign from the party.72 Foulkes failed in his appeal to overturn the outcome of this 
case in 1962 and in farcical circumstances was forced to chair the proceedings of his own 
expulsion from the union.73 The trial also affected the ETU’s relationship with the wider union 
movement. The TUC General Secretary George Woodcock declared a need to take action 
against any fraudulent practice in union elections, stating ‘I don’t think what has happened is 
a reflection of the [trade union] movement but of the individuals who seek to misuse it for 
purposes which have nothing to do with trade unionism’.74 Woodcock put forward a resolution 
to the 1961 TUC conference requesting the expulsion of the ETU, which passed with a majority 
of over 6,500,000 – an act that was followed by the Labour Party in October that year.75 
Woodcock considered this a ‘painful business’, but redemption was offered to the union once 
it was cleansed of corruption, something the ETU’s new leadership sought to address.76  
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The new leadership was given a vote of confidence in 1963 when ETU elections 
consolidated their position – most notably Cannon’s election to the union’s presidency in 
September ahead of two communist challengers.77 This was reiterated in July 1964, when the 
ETU’s members were balloted about the proposed ban of CPGB members from holding union 
office. Cannon noted to the press that ‘it will be up to our 280,000 members to decide once and 
for all whether we should keep the Communists out of power in our union for ever’.78 The 
ballot was a clear endorsement: 43,000 members of the union voted in favour of the ban, 
compared to 16,500 against.79 As a result, Rule 10, Clause 3, Sub-section (d) banned ETU 
members who held CPGB membership from holding any representative positions, including 
that of a conference delegate.80 Commenting on the ban in Sparks Fly!, Chapple noted that: 
Bans and proscriptions on trade unionists, whatever their political views, are nothing to celebrate – they 
are at best a necessary evil – but my personal experience of the Communist Party has led me to one 
conclusion: that communists should not hold office in any trade union. They will use the power and 
influence they gain to further the interests of the Party as a priority and to undermine, if not overthrow, 
genuine democracy.
81 
Although aware that it was morally questionable, Chapple’s rationale for the ban drew 
on his previous experiences in the CPGB, which gave him authority in this instance, rather than 
incriminating him. This rule was unsuccessfully contested in the High Court in March 1965, 
and subsequently forced twenty full-time ETU officials to resign from the CPGB.82 The ban 
also impacted the policy of the ETU, which underwent a subtle ideological shift in this period. 
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In 1965, for example, it tabled an amendment to a TUC motion on the Vietnam War, which 
sought to remove an anti-American implication in a motion calling for ‘the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops’ from Vietnam – a subtle but notable change from previous years.83 
 
Leading the union  
 
After suffering a stroke in 1961, Byrne’s involvement in the ETU was limited, and he did not 
seek re-election in 1966.84 Chapple temporarily took up Byrne’s mantle and became widely 
tipped to replace him in the 1966 election.85 Given the events of 1961, this was a particularly 
sensitive election and union officials were keen for this ballot to be above any suspicion – 
something that nearly failed owing to a fear of mislaid ballot papers.86 Chapple won this 
election and took a position at the top of the union that he went on to occupy for nearly two 
decades. Chapple’s first years in post were dogged by political infighting and, in some cases, 
physical violence. In October 1967 he was ‘manhandled’ during an incident at the ETU 
headquarters where demonstrators took over the canteen, and ‘mutineers’ sought to form a 
breakaway union concerned that ‘Chapple and Cannon have the members in a tighter grip than 
the Reds they deposed ever had’.87 The pair were also the target of attacks from the Soviet 
newspaper Trud (Labour), which claimed that the ‘Cannon-Chappel [sic] group’ were the first 
to praise the ‘anti-worker’ actions of the Harold Wilson’s government and accused the pair of 
secretly filming factory meetings so that ‘trouble-makers’ could be identified and punished.88 
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Soviet interest in the ETU highlights the international implications of their efforts, and that 
their actions were being noted behind the Iron Curtain.  
Amidst these challenges, Cannon and Chapple consolidated their position through 
inquiries into disturbances and instructed ETU members to not associate themselves with an 
opposition group they condemned as ‘an alliance of communists and Trotskyists planning to 
form a breakaway organisation’.89 By June 1968 these efforts were paying off, as Cannon was 
re-elected as President of the ETU with over 15,000 more votes than his nearest rival Frederick 
Morphew, who notably campaigned ‘with communist support’.90 This result did not nullify the 
communist wing of the union, who continued their protests against Cannon and Chapple. In 
response to a protest in August 1968, Chapple noted that ‘the interesting thing about these 
demonstrations is that they have been taking place since our ballots stopped being rigged and 
the executive committee is no longer controlled by communists. Where were the demonstrators 
when the rigging was going on?’91  
Following ‘a long courtship’ in the late 1960s, the ETU merged with the Plumbing 
Trades Union (PTU) to form the amalgamated Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and 
Plumbing Union (EETPU), a union with a larger membership – the fifth largest union in the 
country at the time – and, as a result, greater clout in the union movement than ever before.92 
At the same time, Chapple’s position shifted following Cannon’s premature death in December 
1970. Before his death, Cannon recommended that the leadership of the union be consolidated 
in one position, rather than the dual positions of authority that Chapple and Cannon had carried 
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as General Secretary and President respectively, which Chapple thought had worked only 
because of their ‘personal friendship’.93 Following Cannon’s death, Chapple consolidated these 
roles, initially by occupying the presidency whilst the process to elect his successor took 
place.94 Despite a vociferous challenge by Mark Young, the union’s national officer who had 
positioned himself as a ‘non-Communist’, rather than Chapple’s more combative ‘anti-
Communist’, Chapple went on to win the election.95 Not only did Chapple now occupy the two 
most senior positions in the union, cementing his position as its leading force, he did so whilst 
asserting his desire to continue to cleanse the union of communist influence.96 As The Times’ 
Labour Correspondent Paul Routledge neatly observed in a report from the union’s 1971 
conference: ‘rout of left clinches Chapple reign’.97 Chapple recognized this too, noting that ‘I 
finally established myself at that conference as the man in charge of the EETPU’, a position 
that was consolidated through further electoral successes in 1971 and 1976, increasing his 
majority over his rivals on each occasion.98 From challenging the leadership of the union in the 
late 1950s, Chapple had risen to an unprecedented position of power in the 1970s whilst 
asserting an anti-communist position, something that was supported by the EETPU’s members. 
 
A new cause? 
During Chapple’s rise to the leadership of the EETPU, human rights violations in the Soviet 
Union were gaining increased international recognition. Recent scholarship has emphasized 
the centrality of the 1970s as a period in which human rights as an area of wider activists' 
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concern experienced their ‘breakthrough’, also providing it with greater political traction in 
international relations.99 The persecution of individuals such as Vladimir Bukovsky, Zhores 
Medvedev and Alexander Solzhenitsyn was becoming increasingly known internationally, 
owing largely to the efforts of activist organizations distributing information to politicians, 
journalists and public figures.100 Trade unionists were not overlooked by these activists, and 
groups such as Amnesty International, the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly 
Prosecuted and the Women’s Campaign for Soviet Jewry made particular efforts to lobby 
unions for their support. Given the EETPU’s history and Chapple’s fervent anti-communism, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that the union keenly responded to these overtures, with its members 
making frequent reference to abuses taking place in the Soviet bloc at TUC conferences.101 
This is notable given that other human rights violations taking place in this period, including 
the suppression of trade unions in Spain and the persecution of the labour movement under 
General Pinochet in Chile, were seemingly overlooked despite being arguably closer to the 
interests of the EETPU’s members.102 Chapple addressed this in a December 1976 letter to Len 
Murray, the General Secretary of the TUC, noting that, 
If it were for matters affecting Spain, Portugal, Greece, South Africa and the like, no stone of 
protest would be left unturned by the General Council to express contempt to those 
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governments, and my union believes the General Council has one view for right wing 
dictatorships and another for the left.103 
Chapple’s intent here appears to be an attempt to level the playing field, ensuring that 
Soviet abuses were considered by the trade union movement alongside abuses in right-wing 
regimes, although his involvement in anti-communist efforts in his union is also difficult to 
ignore here. This letter came days after Vladimir Bukovsky was released to the West in a high-
profile prisoner exchange, suggesting that Chapple’s concerns were also influenced by 
contemporaneous events, and a desire to capitalise on the momentum that they offered.104  
The malleable definition of human rights and the lack of political gravitas that it held 
before the 1970s ‘breakthrough’ mean that a clear assessment of how individuals understood 
the term in this period is inherently challenging. In Chapple’s case, it is notable that the only 
specific references to human rights in Sparks Fly! relate to the Soviet Union. Human rights 
issues in Chile and Spain affecting trade unionists in the same period did not draw comment in 
the same fashion, suggesting that his interests in Soviet human rights went beyond an altruistic 
moral concern, drawing on his anti-communist views in this period.105  
Chapple was especially concerned about the refuseniks, Jews who sought to emigrate 
from the Soviet Union and were subsequently persecuted as a result. The refusenik cause drew 
international attention in the context of the Cold War, with the persecution of prominent 
refuseniks such as Anatoly Shcharansky being widely reported, again no doubt due to the 
efforts of Soviet Jewry activists promoting his case.106 Chapple sent a number of letters to the 
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TUC in the 1970s about the refuseniks, calling for them to use their connections with their 
Soviet equivalent, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), to lobby the 
Soviet authorities on this matter and to offer practical support where possible. Chapple’s 
persistence in this correspondence is notable. In November 1975 he requested that a TUC 
delegation deliver a petition on behalf of the Women’s Campaign for Soviet Jewry to the Soviet 
embassy in London, noting that it had been signed by a ‘large number’ of TUC delegates and 
outlining the difficulties EETPU representatives faced in delivering this petition.107 The TUC 
refused, stating that its intervention in this matter would have little benefit and recommending 
instead that the leadership of the EETPU send this petition directly to the Soviet government.108 
Chapple refuted this, highlighting what he argued was the great benefit of the TUC’s 
endorsement, noting that ‘such association by the oldest trade union movement in the world, 
with its long records of fighting for liberty throughout the world, would inevitably add weight 
to the petition, whose aims I am sure we all endorse’.109 He pressed the TUC’s executive on 
this issue, who in turn debated whether this was in fact a trade union issue, or if other 
organizations such as the Labour Party would be more suited to aiding Chapple and the EETPU 
in this instance.110 Chapple and his colleagues were adamant that the TUC should be pursuing 
this issue as a trade union matter, noting their concern over a seeming lack of attention to this 
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issue. At the 1978 TUC annual conference, the EETPU’s representative W. P. Blair stated with 
clear frustration, 
It is with some regret that once again I am compelled, on behalf of my union to register its 
disappointment in connection with its attempt to convince the General Council to take some 
note of, and some steps about, our protest in connection with what is happening to workers in 
the Soviet Union because they are Jewish, where arbitrary dismissals are taking place…We 
shall continue to press for the assistance of the Committee. This must be the third or the fourth 
time I have been to this rostrum to speak on this subject.111 
Blair’s exasperation echoed a broader clash taking place between Chapple and other 
unionists at the 1978 TUC conference. Commenting on the conference, The Guardian’s Labour 
correspondent Keith Harper noted that the ‘heated exchanges’ between Chapple and TUC 
chairman Jack Jones exposed a split in the TUC’s attitude towards reports of human rights 
violations in the Soviet Union, with Chapple’s attempts to be publicly critical clashing with 
Jones’s desire for a non-confrontational approach on the matter. Chapple’s assertion that ‘it 
seems to have escaped the TUC’s attention that the repressive apparatus created by Stalin has 
never been dismantled’ demonstrated his clear frustrations at the lack of action, and also 
perhaps a lack of tact given his own past CPGB membership during Stalin’s rule.112 The context 
of Chapple’s desire to draw upon the TUC’s historic ‘fight for liberty’ to support this petition 
whilst suppressing communist members of his own union is also worth noting, especially given 
the apparent contradictions of where liberty should and should not be fought for in this instance. 
In this period, Chapple’s ire was raised further by the news that Alexander Shelepin, 
the AUCCTU chairman, Politburo member and former head of the KGB, was to be welcomed 
to Britain by trade unionists in March 1975. The Women’s Campaign for Soviet Jewry wrote 
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to trade unionists outlining their ‘disgust and revulsion that official English hospitality should 
be extended to this man’, strikingly adding that ‘an invitation to the former head of the KGB 
in the 1970s is akin to an invitation to a Nazi leader in the 1930s and 1940s’.113 Likewise, the 
Labour MP Greville Janner drew parallels between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 
describing Shelepin as ‘without question the most unwelcome guest in this country since 
[Rudolf] Hess’.114 Chapple was similarly frank in his opinion of the former KGB boss, noting 
in the Daily Record that ‘the only experience Shelepin has of workers is throwing them in 
jail’.115 However, Chapple’s real venom on this matter was reserved for trade unionists; both 
those who welcomed Shelepin on this visit and those who refused to use his visit to put pressure 
on the Soviet authorities for their abuse of human rights:  
When visiting Communist ‘trade unionists’ visit a Western country, their hosts are usually too 
polite, or too sycophantic, to tell them precisely what we think of the most repressive regime 
the world has ever known… Only if massive peaceful demonstrations, protesting about this 
visit and calling for the restitution of democracy in Soviet political and trade union life, take 
place will the visit have served any purpose.116 
Chapple’s public criticisms were echoed in private correspondence. In a letter to Cyril 
Plant, the General Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, Chapple noted ‘I have just 
read your nauseating rubbish in your journal about that butcher Shelepin. How an ex-KGB 
boss, who is appointed to keep control of the so-called trade union movement, becomes 
“Brother Shelepin” is beyond me.’117 Chapple argued that engaging with Shelepin offered him 
a platform to promote the Soviet Union and discredit the TUC, stating that ‘we do not believe 
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you can reconcile free democratic trade unions with state controlled [sic] puppets, whether of 
the fascist or communist variety’.118 
Whilst Chapple’s concerns over British trade unionists engaging with Shelepin and the 
lack of action by the TUC on the Soviet Union clearly had merit, the context of his concerns is 
important. His past membership of the CPGB and the suppression of political views within the 
EETPU was only too apparent for its communist members, who became increasingly vocal 
about their concerns, petitioning for their rights by circulating materials that were deeply 
critical of Chapple’s leadership. The Ugly Face of Chapple’s Union and How to Change it was 
one such pamphlet produced by the anonymous EETPU ‘rank and file’ that was vicious in its 
criticisms of Chapple.119 It contained accusations that Chapple was in the pockets of corporate 
interests, dubbing him a ‘confirmed marketeer’, ‘one track minded and bitter’, and arguing that 
he was reliant on increasingly undemocratic methods to govern.120 Such rhetoric is perhaps 
unsurprising, given that the pamphlet was dedicated to the ‘fine rank and file socialists in the 
EETPU who struggled throughout their lives against everything that Frank Chapple stands 
for’.121  
Whilst it is largely dedicated to union issues such as pay and unemployment, the most 
interesting aspect of The Ugly Face for this article is the section devoted to Chapple’s political 
history. The pamphlet argues that Chapple had cynically remained a CPGB member until his 
election to the ETU Executive Council in 1957, implying that he had benefitted politically from 
his affiliation with the CPGB. Most critically of all, it argued that his ‘reds-under-the-beds 
theme … gives him the self-righteousness of a converted sinner’ and that his concern for human 
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rights violations in the Soviet Union was ‘hollow-sounding rubbish’.122 As a political attack, 
this was remarkably deft, raising questions about Chapple’s personal legitimacy and his ability 
to condemn the oppressive behaviour of a regime he once supported. Whilst individuals should 
rightfully be given the space to change their mind, the nature of Chapple’s political volte face 
was dramatic, and opened the space for these criticisms to be made. This raised questions about 
his political past and the full sincerity with which he was supporting Soviet human rights issues.  
Chapple responded to The Ugly Truth by taking legal action against its printers, the 
Socialist Worker, arguing that it was libellous.123 In the face of criticisms that raised 
challenging questions about Chapple’s past, shifting focus to the factual basis of the ‘rank and 
file’ claims deflected attention from particularly uncomfortable issues, delegitimized the nature 
of the claims made in The Ugly Face, and cast light away from a potentially sensitive area. 
Legal action did not stop the production of material by those critical of Chapple on this issue. 
The ‘rank and file’ published another pamphlet, End the Ban, in 1979 that focused specifically 
on the ban of CPGB members holding office in the EETPU. This pamphlet was more restrained 
in its anti-Chapple tone than The Ugly Face, presumably as a result of the previous legal action. 
It detailed the position of CPGB members within the EETPU arguing that the union’s rules 
were undemocratic, discriminatory and driven by ‘a whipped up anti-communist atmosphere’ 
in the 1960s, leading to a situation where, ‘democratic grass roots resistance had to be throttled’ 
for structural reforms to take place.124 Once the ban came into force, this pamphlet argued, 
CPGB members had been so completely isolated in the union and forced to deal with ‘loaded 
propaganda’ against them that EETPU members could be ‘completely unaware of political 
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discrimination in their union’.125 Like The Ugly Truth, End the Ban also noted the ‘persistent 
contradiction’ of the EETPU’s efforts to publicly condemn Soviet suppression of political 
freedom whilst its internal policies limited the political freedoms of its members.126 Whilst the 
suppression of CPGB members in EETPU politics is far from equivalent to the levels of 
persecution experienced by Soviet prisoners of conscience, this parallel is striking. End the Ban 
goes further to assert that the union’s leadership had focused almost entirely on events in the 
Soviet bloc, ignoring issues such as reports of violations taking place in Iran amongst other 
right-wing regimes. Such a focus was derided in this pamphlet as ‘the crudest hypocrisy’ and 
highlights the broad frustrations that critics of Chapple and the EETPU’s anti-communist 
policy held in this period.127  
 
Conclusion 
After his appearance at the 1985 Sakharov Hearings, Chapple received a letter from Irina 
Alberti, the editor of the Russian émigré journal Russkaya Mysl (Russian Thought), who noted 
‘I feel sure that many among our dissidents…will feel as thankful to you as I am, and even 
more so those who still live in the Soviet Union and with whom we are in touch’.128 Chapple’s 
place in the hearings was doubtless a result of his concern about human rights violations taking 
place in the Soviet Union. However, a nuanced approach is needed to understand his support 
for Soviet human rights, something that highlights the important role of the history of the 
British left in motivating the concerns of Chapple and his union on this matter. Support for 
these issues was not driven solely by altruism, but was also influenced by the historic 
interaction between British trade unionists and the CPGB – something that goes someway to 
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explain Chapple’s resolute focus on concerns in the Soviet bloc, rather than human rights 
internationally.  
Chapple’s position in the network of activists concerned with human rights violations 
in the Soviet Union is full of inherent complexities. His communist past and subsequent anti-
communism make his support for initiatives such as the Sakharov Hearings complex to assess, 
something made all the more complicated by the picture that Chapple retrospectively painted 
of his involvement with the CPGB and subsequent ideological awakening. Chapple’s claim 
that ‘once I fully realised the sick and squalid past in which I had shared and the gross injustice 
our members suffered as a consequence, I had no choice’ may have felt correct to him at the 
time of writing in the 1980s, but it does not capture the nature of his political transition or the 
impact that it had on his later efforts in support of human rights.129 Despite retrospectively 
claiming ideological doubts from the mid-1940s onwards, Chapple’s 1957 resignation from the 
CPGB suggests that this transition was not solely due to ideological concerns, but that 
pragmatism also played a role. This delay could be partly attributed to personal difficulties in 
leaving the party. This was no easy process, given friendships that were tightly interwoven 
with its activities – personal investments that were possibly exorcized from later accounts of 
this period. It is also possible that Chapple sought to reform the corrupt union from within, 
although this is difficult to prove conclusively. What is perhaps most interesting about 
Chapple’s political transition is that it did little to affect his political credibility. If anything, 
this transition gave Chapple increased political clout, and allowed him to be recast as a leading 
anti-communist figure with particular authority; somewhat ironically because of his previous 
position as a communist. Attempts by his critics to draw attention to this failed to wound his 
reputation, again revealing much about the political climate of the day and the somewhat 
uncomfortable closeness that some British trade unionists had had with communism.  
                                                          




Chapple’s involvement with the Sakharov Hearings and concerns for human rights 
issues in the Soviet bloc also highlights that trade union concerns for human rights issues both 
reflected the growing interest in human rights in this ‘breakthrough’ period and were influenced 
by broader debates in the British labour movement on Soviet communism. In the case of the 
EETPU and Chapple, this was interwoven with the union’s history of communist manipulation. 
Whilst not clearly articulated in public, the EETPU’s focus on human rights violations in the 
Soviet Union doubtless drew on its past interactions with the CPGB. Chapple may have been 
the public face of this, but it is important to note that his anti-communist leadership of the 
EETPU was also supported by its members who consistently backed him in elections. This 
demonstrates that this approach had deeper roots in the union, and that support for these issues 
was about more than just a personal crusade by Chapple. The human rights ‘breakthrough’ of 
the 1970s was just one component of the concern for Soviet human rights violations from the 
British trade union movement, and the broader history of its interaction with Soviet 
communism also had a significant influence on the efforts to highlight Soviet human rights 
violations. Trade union tensions in the 1950s and 1960s echoed into human rights campaigns 
in the 1970s and 1980s, something that can be clearly seen in the support given to Soviet human 
rights campaigns by Chapple and the EETPU. 
